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ABSTRACT
Drawing on new data and advances in exchange rate regimes’ classification, we find that countries
appear to benefit by having increasingly flexible exchange rate systems as they become richer and
more financially developed.  For developing countries with little exposure to international capital
markets, pegs are notable for their durability and relatively low inflation.  In contrast, for advanced
economies, floats are distinctly more durable and also appear to be associated with higher growth.
For emerging markets, our results parallel the Baxter and Stockman classic exchange regime























  This paper offers a distinct new twist to the existing academic and policy literature on 
the durability and performance of alternative exchange rate regimes by drawing on new data 
and on a new de facto approach to classifying exchange rate regimes (see Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2004).
1 Although there are many nuances, overall our results suggest that for 
relatively poor countries with little access to international capital markets, pegged exchange 
rate regimes work surprisingly well, delivering both relatively low inflation and relatively 
high exchange rate regime durability. This finding is in contrast to the growing conventional 
policy wisdom that pegs are universally unstable and crisis prone. However, we also find that 
as countries become richer and more financially developed, they benefit by moving to more 
flexible exchange rate systems. Indeed, for advanced economies, flexible exchange rate 
systems are remarkably durable and (controlling for other factors) yield somewhat higher 
growth without higher inflation. For emerging markets, the exchange regime does not appear 
to have a systematic effect on inflation or growth, although— in line with conventional 
wisdom—pegs are distinctly more vulnerable to banking and exchange rate crises. 
  Our results also indicate that, in general, exchange rate regimes have been steadily 
becoming less durable since the mid-1970s, with emerging markets experiencing the most 
instability. An important exception, however, is advanced economies, for which durability 
                                                 
1 The distinction between stated (de jure) and actual (de facto) policies has received 
considerable prominence recently, with contributions from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2002, 2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The IMF itself now publishes regime 
descriptions that lean towards the de facto characterization. However, de facto measures vary 





has increased, particularly for flexible rate systems. We also observe a broad trend towards 
exchange rate regimes with intermediate levels of inflexibility (in contrast to the once 
fashionable bi-polar hypothesis). Extrapolating out our estimated exchange rate regime 
transition matrices suggests that pegs, which today account for roughly 40% of all 
developing country and emerging market exchange rates, will account for only 25% of all 
regimes in 2020, with intermediate regimes taking up the slack. 
  In the next section, we discuss alternatives to regime classification and then present 
evidence on regime durability for all countries and also for developing and emerging market 
economies. We turn to the evidence on regime performance—evaluating performance in 
terms of inflation, growth, and crisis outcomes, and differentiating once again between 
developing, emerging, and advanced economies. It is important to note that whereas one’s 
perspective on regime durability can be quite sensitive to the particular classification system 
chosen, our results on regime performance are much less sensitive. Rather, the key factor 
underpinning our results is our three-way grouping of countries into developing, emerging, 
and advanced. The final section concludes. 
 
2. REGIME CLASSIFICATION AND DURABILITY 
  Any assessment of the impact of a country’s exchange rate regime on its economic 
performance must first settle on definitions for alternative regimes. This section makes a case 
for using Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) “Natural” classification for characterizing true 
regimes. It then uses the Natural classification to document the main features of regime 




markedly different levels of development and relationship with international capital markets. 
Longevity of regimes may be suggestive of stronger sustainability and superior performance.  
 
2.1 Regime  classification 
The early debate on exchange rate regimes largely focused on the benefits and costs 
associated with fixed versus flexible regimes. In their analysis, Baxter and Stockman (1989) 
essentially viewed regimes in industrial countries as either fixed or floating. Subsequent 
analysis, and indeed Baxter and Stockman’s own comments on developing countries, 
increasingly recognized that countries’ regimes are often neither completely fixed nor fully 
flexible. As Williamson (2000) has argued, such “intermediate” regimes could, in principle, 
allow countries to reap the benefits of fixed and flexible regimes without incurring some of 
their costs. Others, however, have been more skeptical. According to the “bipolar” view, 
intermediate regimes are unsustainable over the long run, forcing countries—at least those 
with open capital accounts—to choose between freely floating exchange rates or monetary 
union with another currency.
2  
Beyond the level of disaggregation of regimes is the system by which they are 
classified. Until the late 1990s, the only comprehensive classification available was the one 
                                                 
2 For example, Eichengreen (1994) argued that countries “will be forced to choose between 
floating exchange rates on the one hand and monetary unification on the other.” More 
recently, Summers (2000) has argued that, for economies with access to international capital 
markets, “the choice of appropriate exchange rate regime... increasingly means a move away 
from the middle ground of pegged but adjustable fixed exchange rates towards the two corner 
regimes.” Fischer (2001) even presented evidence to support his view that “[I]n the last 
decade, there has been a hollowing out of the middle of the distribution of exchange rate 
regimes in a bipolar direction, with the share of both hard pegs and floating gaining at the 




produced annually by the IMF, on the basis of countries’ announced (or de jure) regimes. In 
practice, however, exchange rate regimes often differed from those that had been declared. 
For example, devaluations were common in some “pegged” regimes, while many floats 
moved within tight bands. Consequently, the de jure classification inaccurately characterized 
the de facto regime. Recognizing this problem, the IMF itself moved to a new de facto 
classification from 1999 that combined information on the exchange rate and monetary 
policy framework and policy intentions with data on actual exchange rate and reserves 
movements.
3 Other de facto regime classification systems have also been proposed, including 
those by Ghosh et al. (1997), who classified regimes on a de facto basis using information on 
actual exchange rate movements, and Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003), who reexamined the 
evidence on macroeconomic performance under alternative de jure regimes by checking the 
robustness of their results against a hybrid de jure/de facto classification.
4 Another 
classification system, devised by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), discarded the de jure 
classification altogether and instead employed purely statistical techniques to exchange rate 
and reserves data to determine the de facto flexibility of exchange rate regimes.
5  
                                                 
3 See IMF (1999), Chapter IV, for details. The IMF de facto classification is, in effect, a 
hybrid classification system that combines data on actual flexibility with information on the 
policy framework. Using historical data and information on countries’ exchange 
arrangements, Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) have put together a database containing IMF 
de facto classifications for virtually all IMF member countries going back to 1990. 
4 The hybrid classification—referred to as the “consensus” classification by Ghosh, Gulde, 
and Wolf—discards observations for which the de jure classification does not match a de 
facto one based on actual exchange rate movements. Effectively, this procedure narrows the 
sample by 35 percent over the 1970-99 period. 
5 The Levy-Yeyati–Sturzenegger dataset, which goes back to 1974, attempts to classify—on 





In setting forth their comprehensive “Natural” classification scheme, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) note that the other de facto classification systems, while more appropriate than 
the de jure classification, continue to misclassify regimes because they do not take into 
account several key features in regimes’ actual operation. Their Natural classification seeks 
to address the potential misclassification by separating episodes of macroeconomic instability 
that are characterized by very high inflation rates, often reflected in high and frequent 
exchange rate depreciation, into a “freely falling” category. Classification of such episodes as 
floating, intermediate, or pegged is problematic, since the macroeconomic disturbances could 
be incorrectly attributed to the exchange rate regime. Moreover, where a parallel exchange 
rate deviates substantially from the official rate, movements in the parallel rate—which 
offers a more realistic barometer of the underlying monetary stance, rather than the official 
rate—are used to gauge the flexibility of the regime.
6 Lastly, to avoid recording a large 
number of regime shifts following exchange rate and reserves movements that are, in fact, 
related to transient economic or political shocks but do not involve a change in the 
underlying regime, the Natural classification employs a rolling five-year horizon to measure 
the true flexibility of the regime. This helps distinguish between longer-term “regimes” and 
shorter-term “spells” within a regime, such as the widening of a horizontal band or a one-
time devaluation followed by a re-peg.  
                                                                                                                                                       
of the observations in their sample cannot be classified by their algorithm because of missing 
data or because the exchange rate was pegged to an undisclosed basket. 
6 Dual or multiple exchange rates were prevalent in the early 1970s, accounting for about one 
half of all regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). In recent years, however, the proportion of 




Comparison of regime classifications across the de jure and Natural classifications 
highlights the pitfalls of using the de jure classification to draw inferences about regime 
durability or performance. As Figure 1 illustrates, only about one half of the observations—
where each observation corresponds to a given country’s regime in a particular year—were 
classified the same way by both the de jure and the Natural classifications. Among so-called 
“free floats,” only 20 percent in fact operated as true floats, while 60 percent were either 
intermediate or pegged regimes and another 20 percent had freely falling currencies. Hence, 
the wide divergence between the regimes countries say they have and those they actually 
operate potentially suggests considerable variation also in the relationship between stated and 
actual regimes, on the one hand, and economic performance, on the other. 
Viewed through the Natural classification, the global distribution of exchange rate 
regimes has evolved relatively gradually. Although the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
saw a sharp decline in the proportion of pegged regimes, forming the basis of the Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) analysis, the change fell well short of a dichotomous shift from a world of 
pegs to one of floats (Figure 2). A significant proportion of non-pegged regimes were in 
operation during the Bretton Woods era, and pegged regimes have by no means disappeared 
in the post-Bretton Woods period. Rather, they continue to account for a sizable portion of all 
regimes, and their prevalence has actually increased over the past decade. Also, while true 
free floats have been around only since the early 1970s, they remain relatively rare. 
Since the interaction of the exchange rate regime with the performance of the 
economy is likely to be shaped by the economy’s institutional and financial maturity and its 
openness to capital flows, it is helpful to distinguish between different types of countries in 




structure are likely to respond differently to a particular type of exchange rate arrangement 
than are developing countries. Similarly, among developing countries, those that are exposed 
to large capital flows may well perform differently under certain regimes than countries that 
are relatively closed to flows of foreign capital. For the purposes of this analysis, countries 
are divided into three groups—advanced, emerging market, and developing. Advanced 
countries are selected using the World Bank definition for upper income countries, following 
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003). In dividing the remainder, the analytical distinction of 
relevance is their degree of exposure to international capital markets. The emerging markets 
group is defined using the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) classification, which 
designates a country as an emerging market according to a number of factors related to 
international capital market access—GDP per capita, local government regulations, 
perceived investment risk, foreign ownership limits and capital controls, and other factors.
7 
All remaining countries are designated “developing.” The appendix provides a list of 
countries in each group.  
Division of the world into these three groups yields additional insights into the 
distribution and evolution of exchange rate regimes:  
•  As Figure 2 shows, the collapse of Bretton Woods indeed marked a major change in 
the distribution of regimes among advanced economies. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
                                                 
7 To distinguish between emerging and developing economies, exposure to international 
capital can be determined either in a de jure sense (the extent of formal capital controls in 
place) or in a de facto sense (the actual exposure a country faces). In the spirit of this paper, a 
de facto definition was appropriate, an approach also followed by Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and 
Kose (2003). See http://www.msci.com/equity/index.html for more information on the MSCI 




however, pegs regained popularity, although free floats and intermediate regimes 
remained in place in about one half of all advanced economies at the turn of the 
century.  
•  By contrast, the Bretton Woods collapse was much less of a watershed event for 
emerging markets and developing countries, at least as far as their exchange rate 
regimes were concerned. Both groups of countries saw a gradual decline in the share 
of pegs in all regimes during the 1970s and 1980s, but not an abrupt shift.  
•  The prediction of the bipolar hypothesis—that intermediate regimes would tend to 
give way to regimes at either polar end of flexibility—is not evident in the data, 
especially among the emerging markets group, where bipolar proponents had 
considered the hypothesis most applicable. Rather, intermediate regimes have 
constituted the bulk of all regimes in emerging markets for the past two decades, and 
very few emerging markets had moved to true hard pegs or free floats even by 2001. 
  
2.2 Regime  durability 
  If the evolution of exchange rate regimes has varied across different country groups, 
then the durability of alternative regimes has presumably also varied significantly. Figure 3 
illustrates the number of exchange rate regime transitions in each country group since the 
1940s. As can be expected, major global and regional events have influenced the frequency 
of transitions. The Bretton Woods system collapsed on account of the pressures built up in a 
relatively rigid system of exchange rate regimes and was followed by a sharp increase in 
transitions to more flexible arrangements in advanced economies and a fair number of 




central and eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the early 1990s were also 
accompanied by a relatively high frequency of emerging market and developing country 
regime transitions, especially into and subsequently out of the freely falling category. In the 
latter half of the 1990s, as several large emerging markets faced external financing crises, the 
frequency of exchange rate regime transitions among the emerging market group rose once 
again. And in 1999, a major transition occurred among advanced economies with the 
adoption of monetary union in the euro area. 
Once transitions related to these global events and into and out of the freely falling 
category are distinguished, it turns out the frequency of changes in countries’ exchange rate 
regimes today is remarkably similar to fifty years ago. As Figure 2 illustrates, the average 
number of countries transitioning to a different regime (excluding transitions into and out of 
the freely falling category) in any given year since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
was about the same as during the Bretton Woods period. And in the 1990s, fewer low income 
developing countries transitioned toward more flexible regimes than to less flexible regimes, 
although the bulk of the transitions for this group were into and out of the freely falling 
category. 
Calculations of regime durability reveal interesting variation across country groups, 
across regime types, and over time (Table 1). The durability of regimes, measured as the 
average number of years a country maintains its Natural classification regime before 
transitioning to another regime or to a freely falling episode, has been somewhat shorter in 
emerging markets (about 10 years) than in advanced economies (14 years) and developing 
countries (16 years). Since 1975, regime durability in emerging markets has declined further 




international capital flows and their inability to efficiently intermediate them. Advanced 
economies, on the other hand, have seen their exchange rate regimes become more durable 
since the mid-1970s, as the build up of imbalances of the sort that existed toward the end of 
the Bretton Woods period have largely been avoided. 
Contrary to the notion that pegs are less durable than other regimes because they 
require increased macroeconomic policy discipline, Table 1 suggests that pegs have, on 
average, been more durable than other regimes, both during the Bretton-Woods era and 
afterward.
8 Among emerging markets, however, pegs have been less durable than other 
regimes. Since 1975, pegged regimes in emerging markets have lasted, on average, less than 
8½ years, while the average intermediate and floating regime has persisted for 16½ and 11 
years, respectively. This is consistent with the view that exposure to foreign capital flows 
makes it is more difficult to sustain a peg if the domestic financial system is not sufficiently 
mature to efficiently intermediate those flows. While pegs have been much more durable in 
developing countries (both in relation to emerging markets and compared to other regimes in 
developing countries), their longevity has declined quite sharply since 1975, perhaps 
suggesting that sustaining pegs has become more difficult even in developing countries with 
limited exposure to international capital markets.  
                                                 
8 This conclusion contrasts with the results obtained by Klein and Marion (1997), 
Eichengreen and others (1998), and Duttagupta and Ötker-Robe (2003), among others, who 
find the longevity of pegs to be much shorter. This is mainly because the Natural 
classification attempts to identify longer-term regimes rather than short-term “spells,” which 
are analyzed in the other studies. Masson (2001), on the other hand, obtains very similar 





The duration of intermediate regimes in advanced economies has been shorter than 
that of other regimes, especially since 1975. This may be because they have been used as a 
temporary device during a longer-term transition from one polar extreme of flexibility to the 
other, as in the euro area in the 1980s and 1990s. In emerging markets, by contrast, 
intermediate regimes have tended to persist for longer—and have, perhaps, been easier to 
sustain—than other regimes. 
Free floats have proven extremely durable in advanced countries, but fragile in 
developing countries and emerging markets. Advanced economies that have adopted freely 
floating exchange rates have, almost without exception, stuck with them, possibly because 
they have conferred important advantages. Free floats in emerging markets, on the other 
hand, have been extremely rare, and their low average durability (relative to advanced 
country floats) suggests a lingering temptation to “manage” the exchange rate.
9 Lastly, on the 
few occasions they have been adopted, free floats have proven much less durable in 
developing countries. Since 1975, eight developing countries have transitioned out of a freely 
floating regime; of these, six moved to freely falling episodes. This suggests that a truly free 
float arrangement may carry disadvantages for countries with a relatively less developed 
financial and institutional infrastructure. 
  If historical regime transition rates persist, and absent major political shifts toward 
currency unions, the number of pegged regimes in emerging markets and developing 
                                                 
9 The only emerging market countries to move to a freely floating exchange rate since 1975 
have been Malaysia (1998), Indonesia (1999), Korea (1999), and South Africa (1995). Of 
these, Malaysia transitioned to a peg during the following year, while the others maintained a 




countries is likely to decline further. As Figure 3 illustrates, over one half of all developing 
countries and emerging markets had rigid regimes in 1975. By 2001, this ratio had declined 
to under 40 percent. With the same rates of regime transition, pegs would constitute only 
about one third of all regimes by 2020. As developing countries become increasingly 
integrated into global financial markets, however, the durability of alternative exchange rate 
regimes in those countries may well resemble average regime durability rates seen among 
emerging markets during the 1980s and 1990s. In that case, the proportion of pegged regimes 
among developing countries will decline even more, and the proportion of pegs in all 
developing country and emerging market regimes will ease to less than one fourth.
10  
 
3. REGIME PERFORMANCE 
  An important prediction from economic theory is that exchange rate pegs act as a 
disciplining device, allowing policy makers in countries with a high inflation propensity to 
import credibility and, hence, lower inflation from abroad (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989; 
and Dornbusch, 2001). As a policy prescription, nominal exchange rate rigidity—or an 
exchange rate anchor—came back into favor in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially in 
Latin America, where exchange-rate based stabilizations were viewed as particularly helpful 
                                                 
10 It turns out that assuming that emerging market transition rates over the next two decades 
will be similar to advanced country transition rates over the past two decades does not 
meaningfully change the estimated distribution of developing country and emerging market 
regimes in 2020 depicted in Figure 3. Over the longer term, of course, political economy 
considerations may guide regime choice in some countries. For example, some countries may 
choose to join currency unions in the not so distant future. Prospects for regime transitions of 
that nature cannot be assessed on the basis of historical regime durability, however, and are 




following a history of high inflation (Edwards, 2001). In this line of reasoning, the harder the 
peg, the more effective it is in enhancing credibility (Edwards and Magendzo, 2003a).  
  The proposition that pegs provide an inflation advantage is far from universally held, 
however. As exposure to international capital flows increases, a larger fraction of the 
monetary aggregates needs to be backed to maintain the peg. Hence, emerging markets are 
less likely to be able to import credibility than other developing countries where interaction 
with international capital markets is more limited. Tornell and Velasco (2000) raise the 
possibility that the inflationary gains from fixed regimes are illusory. No exchange rate 
system, they argue, can ultimately act as a substitute for sound macroeconomic policies. Far 
from exerting discipline, fixed exchange rate regimes may create an incentive for 
governments with short time horizons to cheat, delivering temporarily higher growth through 
larger deficits, with the full inflationary cost of such policies borne following the eventual 
collapse of the peg. 
  The theoretical implications of exchange rate regimes for economic growth and 
volatility are similarly murky, with various opposing claims.
11 In favor of pegs, Dornbusch 
(2001) argues that lower inflation associated with rigid exchange rate regimes would reduce 
interest rates and uncertainty, spurring investment and growth.
12 Also, where a country ties 
its currency tightly to that of another through a currency board arrangement, transactions 
                                                 
11 For a useful summary, see Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault, 2002. 
12 Such a beneficial outcome may have prevailed in the post-convertibility Bretton-Woods 
period from 1959-1971 when inflation and exchange rate volatility were low and growth was 
relatively strong (Bordo, 2003). However, it is not clear whether this was the consequence of 




costs may be lowered, increasing trade between the two countries. Frankel and Rose (2002) 
find that such expansion of trade is not offset by diversion away from other trade partners 
and, hence, by increasing the openness of the economy, this form of exchange rate rigidity 
also raises output growth. An argument in favor of exchange rate flexibility is the possibility 
of rapid resource reallocation following real shocks where short-run price rigidity is 
significant (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003). Broda (2001) finds evidence that terms of 
trade shocks are amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. Edwards 
and Levy-Yeyati (2003) take that empirical analysis one step further and conclude that the 
inability of rigid regimes to absorb such shocks translates, in practice, into lower growth. 
Similarly, Calvo (1999) argues that the need to defend a peg following a negative external 
shock may result in high real interest rates and also stifle growth. 
  While flexible exchange rate regimes may, in principle, dampen real shocks to the 
economy, could the very flexibility of the exchange rate introduce a new element of 
volatility? As noted above, a robust finding is that nominal exchange rate volatility is 
associated with high real exchange rate volatility. Rogoff (1999) argues that such variability 
does not, in practice, have significant effects on output and consumption in advanced 
economies but may be harmful in developing countries. However, even if the higher 
volatility has harmful effects, pegged regimes may not be the appropriate policy response 
since the volatility may only apparently be contained and have real (adverse) effects on 
private investment due to the greater uncertainty over regime sustainability.  
  Indeed, just as the inflation-reducing benefits of exchange rate rigidity were being 
emphasized in the early 1990s, a fundamental reevaluation of the policy prescription was 




this concern, see, for example, Eichengreen, 1994; and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Obstfeld 
and Rogoff noted in 1995, following the collapse of the British pound in September 1992 and 
of the Mexican peso in December 1994, that: “Many recent efforts to peg exchange rates 
within narrow ranges have ended in spectacular debacles.” They went on to conclude: “These 
events are not unprecedented but their ferocity and scope have called into question the 
viability of fixed rates among sovereign nations in today’s world of highly developed global 
capital markets.” The subsequent fall of tightly managed regimes in East Asia (1997), Russia 
(1998), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2002), has served as a continuing warning against 
pegged regimes, especially in emerging markets subject to volatile capital flows. Pegged 
exchange rates—or those with limited flexibility—invite speculative activity against the 
exchange rate and lead to abandonment of the peg, currency overshooting, and large output 
costs (Larrain and Velasco, 2001). Pegged regimes may also be subject to a higher incidence 
of banking crises. Under pegs, the exchange rate may become progressively overvalued, 
weakening the financial system; without (or with only limited) lender of last resort 
capabilities, authorities may be unable to deal with domestic financial distress. 
 
3.1  Inflation, growth, and volatility under alternative regimes 
  Conflicting policy objectives and large macroeconomic imbalances will lead to poor 
economic performance irrespective of the exchange rate regime. For the purposes of this 
discussion, there are at least two sets of conditions under which the exchange rate regime 
may have no independent influence on macroeconomic outcomes through the prevailing 
severity of economic distortions. First, the prevalence of dual (or multiple) rates—and, 




in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), a consideration in determining the operative regime as well as 
a factor influencing economic outcomes. Second, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) isolate 
countries with annual inflation rates above 40 percent into a separate “freely falling” 
category, with the implication that the macroeconomic imbalances in such conditions 
overwhelm the possible effects of the exchange rate regime. 
  The evidence suggests that dual exchange rates are associated with significantly 
worse economic performance. Over the period 1970–99, the average per capita income 
growth rate in countries with dual exchange rates was about 0.6 percent per year; in contrast, 
countries with unified rates grew at three times the pace, at about 1.8 percent per year 
(Table 2). Similarly, annual inflation in countries with dual exchange rates was about 
175 percent, while under unified rates it was about 22 percent. These performance 
differences primarily reflect instances of large departures from official rates—the differences 
in median performance are less egregious. With increasingly integrated capital markets, large 
gaps in official and parallel rates have become untenable and the move to unified exchange 
rates has been almost universal. 
  By construction, “freely falling” regimes perform significantly worse than other 
regimes on all counts: they have higher inflation and also lower growth rates and higher 
volatility (Tables 3, 4, and 5). With the worldwide decline in inflation, the incidence of freely 
falling regimes is on the decline (Rogoff, 2003). However, for retrospective analyses, since 
freely falling episodes are typically classified under other systems as freely floating, their 
identification as a separate category in the Natural classification can make a significant 
difference to the relative rankings of regimes. For example, according to the de jure 




regimes. Under the Natural classification (the bottom row of Table 3), however, freely 
floating regimes have, on average, lower inflation than exchange rate pegs. This reversal 
occurs because, as noted, many freely falling episodes are in the floating regime category 
according to the de jure classification. When other influences on inflation are controlled for 
(see below), the advantage of pegged and intermediate regimes over the floating regime 
reappears even in the Natural classification; however, not distinguishing the freely falling 
category renders that advantage much larger.   
  The performance of intermediate regimes is not especially different from that of other 
regimes. This is consistent with the longevity of these regimes, as documented above. If this 
comparison had revealed consistently poorer performance under intermediate regimes, there 
would have been greater basis for expecting a shift to the polar extremes of pegs and floats. 
  Finally, as documented by Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), and Flood 
and Rose (1995), real exchange rates are more variable, the greater the flexibility of the 
regime (Table 6). Exchange rate volatility is considerably higher under managed floating and 
freely floating regimes than under pegged and limited flexibility regimes. This reflects the 
fact that real rates tend, at least in the short-run, to move closely with nominal rates. Notably, 
more flexibility under the de jure classification is not associated with greater variability of 
the real exchange rate since regimes that are declared flexible are often tightly managed. 
 
3.2  Regimes and crisis probabilities 
  In the 1990s, several economies with rigid exchange rate regimes were victims of 
severe economic crises. A concern thus arose, not just for the prospects of the economies 




with similar economic features following a general loss of investor confidence. The 
occurrence of crises has, therefore, acquired greater prominence in the policy discussions on 
the choice of exchange rate regimes. Despite the policy interest, few systematic studies have 
examined the links between crises and exchange rate regimes.  
  The evidence presented below suggests that popular perception in this regard has 
some statistical basis. While the evidence on currency crises is mixed, the frequency of 
banking and “twin” crises (where banking and currency turbulence comes together) has been 
higher under more rigid regimes but mainly for emerging markets and particularly so in the 
1990s. Emerging markets are more exposed to international capital flows than are other 
developing economies; but compared to advanced industrialized economies, emerging 
markets have fragile financial sectors.
13  
The banking crisis variable is taken from Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). 
They define a banking crisis to have occurred when any one of the following four conditions 
held: (a) non-performing loans exceeded 10 percent of banking system assets; (b) a bailout 
cost 2 percent or more of GDP; (c) large scale nationalization occurred; or (d) other 
emergency measures, such bank holidays, deposit freezes, and special guarantees had to be 
undertaken. The currency or balance-of-payments crisis variable is taken from Berg, 
Borensztein, and Pattillo (2004), who define a crisis as having occurred when the weighted 
average of one-month changes in exchange rate and reserves is more than three (country-
specific) standard deviations above the country average.  
                                                 
13 Any definition of emerging markets is likely to include and exclude countries on the 
margin in ways that are more or less appropriate. Extensive robustness tests were undertaken 




  Consider, first, the frequency of banking crises.
14 More rigid regimes had a higher 
likelihood of banking crises, especially in the 1990s. For all countries, for the period from 
1980-1997, the probability of a banking crisis in a given year varied between about 3 and 
4.5 percent with no clear variation across exchange rate regimes (Table 7). However, the 
highest probabilities of a banking crisis occurred in the emerging market economies, where 
the evidence also suggests that the probability of a crisis increased with the rigidity of the 
exchange rate regime. Moreover, the association between rigidity and probability of banking 
crises in emerging markets became stronger in the 1990s.  
  The finding that banking crises are more likely under rigid regimes is in contrast to 
that of Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003), who conclude that, if anything, floating regimes are 
the most likely to experience banking crises. The difference in findings is the consequence of 
their use of the de jure classification, which has many more countries classified as “floating” 
than does the Natural classification. As shown in Figure 1, many of these de jure “floaters” 
are classified under the Natural Classification as “freely falling;” other “floaters” did not 
actually float and so were de facto under more rigid regime categories. As a consequence, 
using the de jure classification leads to an overstatement of the likelihood of banking crises 
under floating regimes and an understatement of crisis probabilities under more rigid 
regimes. 
                                                 
14 Crisis probabilities were obtained as the ratio of crises episodes under a particular regime 
divided by the number of regime-years. Each crisis was treated as a single episode even if it 
lasted for multiple years. The estimates presented drop the year of the crisis itself as well as 
the years immediately preceding and following the regime change to minimize the influence 




  Currency crises over the years 1970 to 2000 tended to occur more frequently in 
intermediate regimes. The evidence for the 1990s is less clear-cut and suggests that among 
emerging markets pegged regimes had more frequent currency crises. An alternative measure 
of currency crises, using different thresholds for exchange rate depreciation and loss in 
reserves (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Soledad-Martinez, 2001) shows that, for 
emerging markets, pegs and limited flexibility had significantly higher risk of currency crisis 
than managed or freely floating regimes.
15 
  Finally, “twin crises,” when banking and currency crises coincide, have been almost 
uniquely an emerging market phenomenon: they have never occurred in the group of 
countries classified as “developing” and rarely in advanced economies. Moreover, the 
incidence of twin crises in emerging markets is highest under pegged regimes and falls as 
regime flexibility increases. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) have noted that twin crises have 
particularly high costs. Such crises typically start with domestic financial distress, which 
accelerates when a currency crisis also sets in, leading to a “vicious cycle.” Costs are high in 
terms of the bailout costs of the financial sector as well as in terms of reserves lost. Larrain 
and Velasco (2001) provide a theoretical discussion of why currency boards may be 
particularly prone to twin crises. Rigid regimes may promote excessive risk-taking during 
periods of “booms” in capital inflows, when the expectation of an exchange rate guarantee 
reduces the incentive to hedge foreign currency exposure. The sudden withdrawal of flows 
leaves the domestic financial sector susceptible to severe distress. At the same time, the 
                                                 
15 Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) continue to find vulnerability in the intermediate regimes 




commitment to an exchange rate target limits lender of last resort operations. If depositors 
withdraw domestic currency from domestic banks to buy the foreign reserve currency at the 
central bank, under a fixed exchange rate, the panic withdrawal can lead to a self-fulfilling 
crisis as foreign currency reserves are depleted. Argentina’s massive collapse is a cautionary 
tale of how some of these forces can contribute to the unraveling of even a hard peg. 
  
3.3 Econometric  analysis 
While the previous section reported correlations, this section takes the more 
demanding step of attempting to isolate, over the period 1970 to 1999, the association 
between exchange rate regimes and the performance measures of interest, after controlling 
for other variables that may also influence performance.
16 But even after such controls are 
included, reverse causality, or “endogeneity,” remains a concern in such analyses: in other 
words, the observed relationships may reflect the influence of the performance variable on 
the choice of the regime rather than the other way around. This problem cannot be fully 
resolved but is mitigated by the relatively long duration of the typical regime under the 
Natural classification, implying that temporary changes in performance do not influence the 
                                                 
16 In addition to variables that are conventionally used to explain the different dimensions of 
performance (discussed below), two further sets of controls are used throughout. First, 
common shocks across countries (such as spikes in oil prices or changes in the volatility of 
G-3 currencies), influence all economies beyond the effect channeled through observed 
variables. These are controlled for through the use of time dummies. Second, while an 
increasing number of country control variables can be added, certain unobserved or difficult 
to measure country characteristics may reflect important dimensions of institutions and 
policy credibility. These, in turn, are likely to be correlated with exchange rate regimes; to 
control for these unobserved characteristics, country dummies are included. The implication 
of this approach is that regime performance is judged by changes that occur within a country 




choice of regime. The problem is also mitigated by using as an explanatory variable the 
regime prevailing in the previous one or two years and the results presented are unchanged 
when that is done.
17   
Much of the data are taken from Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003), including the de 
jure classification of exchange rate regimes, the three measures of economic performance 
(inflation, growth, growth volatility), and the control (or explanatory) variables used in the 
regression analysis. Each variable is covered at an annual frequency from 1970 to 1999 for 
up to 158 countries. The control variables are drawn from the literature and are thought to 
provide a suitable explanation of the variations in the performance measures. Table 8 
provides a detailed description of the data. It lists each variable, provides a brief description, 
and notes which of the subsequent regressions feature these variables. Using these data has 
the advantage that the evaluation of performance under the Natural classification can be 
directly compared to a well-respected baseline that assesses performance across the de jure 
regimes. 
Our focus in this discussion is on the coefficients on “dummy,” or categorical, 
variables representing the exchange rate regime. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the 
exchange rate regime prevails in a country in a particular year; otherwise, it is assigned a 
value of zero. The coefficients presented in figures are to be interpreted as measures of 
performance (relative to the excluded pegged regime) and conditional upon the other 
included variables in the regression. 
                                                 
17 Moreover, it is difficult to identify country characteristics that consistently predict 
exchange rate regimes. Since regimes are strongly persistent, they are likely to be the best 




Table 9 evaluates inflation performance across all countries, advanced countries, 
emerging markets, and developing countries. Three different specifications are presented: 
(1) the estimates with country fixed effects; (2) the same specification but without fixed 
effects; and (3) a specification with fixed effects but with the regime variables lagged by two 
years. The lagging of the exchange rate regime variables increases the likelihood, though 
does not ensure, that the results reflect the influence of regimes on performance rather than 
the other way around. Table 10 is analogous, except that it examines growth performance. 
The different specifications show that the qualitative direction of the key results presented 
hold up with considerable consistency.  
To summarize, these results suggest that the performance of alternative exchange rate 
regimes, and hence the choice of the appropriate regime, depends importantly on the maturity 
of member countries’ economies and their institutions. Developing economies that have 
limited interactions with international capital markets appear to benefit from policies that 
imply strong commitment to stable exchange rate and monetary policies. The harder end of 
the commitment in exchange rate regimes—either fixed or close to fixed exchange rates—
delivers lower inflation without sacrificing economic growth. Alternatively, more flexible 
regimes are associated with higher inflation but no evident gain in growth. The inflation 
result is highly robust to various changes in specification and almost always shows the 
pattern of increasing inflation with the degree of flexibility, as shown in Table 9.
18 This 
                                                 
18 For example, dropping “small” countries with populations less than 1 million and using an 
even finer differentiation of exchange rate regimes does not change the basic thrust and 




evidence complements the finding that relatively poor and small countries benefit in the form 
of enhanced trade from currency unions (Rose, 2004, and Thom and Walsh, 2002). 
For emerging markets—those developing countries that have significant exposure to 
international capital markets—inflation tends also to be lower in regimes with harder 
commitment to exchange rate stability relative to floating regimes, though the difference is 
smaller than for developing economies (and not always statistically significant). Hence, there 
may be some value to commitment. However, as noted in Table 7, the evidence also suggests 
that where commitments are very hard, i.e., with pegged or nearly pegged regimes, the 
likelihood of financial crises is high, reflecting the inability to adapt to changed 
circumstances, the incentives of entrepreneurs and financial agents to undertake risky 
activities on the presumption that exchange rates will not change, and speculative pressures 
from investors who seek to test the commitment (Rogoff et al. 2004).
19 Thus, commitment 
may deliver macroeconomic stability in the form of slightly lower inflation, on average, but 
those gains may unravel in periodic crises.  
Finally, our results seem to suggest that more flexible regimes may be associated with 
somewhat lower inflation and higher growth in advanced economies. The regression with the 
                                                 
19 Recall that emerging markets were distinguished from other developing countries by their 
exposure to international capital. Since there are no well-defined or generally accepted 
thresholds of exposure to international capital, the cut-off between high and low exposure 
can be arbitrary and was dealt with by dropping and adding countries on the margin to check 
the robustness of the results. For example, in checking for the robustness of results presented, 
India and China (considered to have relatively closed capital accounts) were dropped from 
the emerging markets sample but the results were unchanged. Countries added to the list 
included those that are not on the MSCI index but do appear on other international emerging 
market indices and also such countries as Bahrain, Lebanon, and Tunisia that are not on any 






two-year lagged regime dummies, for example, shows a smooth increase in growth rates as 
the degree of flexibility increases. It is unclear what theoretical model delivers such a 
statistical result. Moreover, for both inflation and growth, the estimated differences across 
regimes are often not statistically significant and tend not to be robust across specifications.
20 
Nevertheless, the results do point to potential benefits to floating for advanced economies, 
and merit further study.  
How do our results compare with those from other studies? Using data for the post-
Bretton Woods era for over 100 countries, the analysis by Ghosh et al. (1997) and Ghosh, 
Gulde, and Wolf (2003) also found that inflation under fixed exchange rate regimes was 
significantly lower than under intermediate or freely floating arrangements, due to greater 
confidence in the currency (a credibility effect) and lower money growth (a discipline effect), 
and that the benefit of pegged exchange rate regimes in terms of inflation performance was 
fairly robust to the endogeneity of regime choice. They did not, however, distinguish 
between groups of countries as we have to identify that this effect applies mainly to relatively 
low-income developing countries. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) used their own de 
facto classification of regimes and found, for a similar sample, that flexible exchange rates 
                                                 
20 The results change with inclusion or exclusion of specific countries but generally show a 
positive coefficient on the floating regime. The results presented drop Kuwait, which 
experienced very rapid growth following the end of the Gulf War in 1992 and also had a 
floating regime at that time. Inclusion of Kuwait leads to a higher and less plausible 
advantage for floating rate regimes. Restricting the sample to OECD economies gives the 
same qualitative result, with the floating advantage being smaller but statistically significant. 




are associated with higher growth in developing countries (including emerging markets); no 
similar association existed among industrial countries.
21   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis suggests that the popular notion that pegged exchange rates are 
problematic everywhere is misplaced. We find, on the one hand, that fixed regimes in poorer 
developing countries with little access to international capital are associated with lower 
inflation and higher durability. For emerging markets, on the other hand, our results are more 
in line with the earlier Baxter-Stockman finding of the absence of any robust relation 
between economic performance and exchange rate regime. However, emerging markets do 
appear to experience crises more frequently under pegged regimes. And for advanced 
economies, we present evidence suggesting that flexible rates may offer significantly greater 
durability and slightly higher growth, without generating higher inflation. Naturally, 
exchange rate regimes are a sufficiently broad sweeping and complex topic that much further 
research is needed to cement these findings and to understand their microeconomic 
underpinnings. But, going forward, we would argue that further studies need to rely on more 
sophisticated de facto classifications of exchange rate regimes, such as the “Natural 
classification” we have used. In particular, exchange rate regime performance should be 
based on classifications that not only look at actual exchange rate behavior but also focus on 
market-based, rather than official, exchange rates. 
                                                 
21 Several missing and inconclusive observations in the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 






Bailliu, J., Lafrance, R., Perrault, J-F., 2002. Does Exchange Rate Policy Matter for Growth? 
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2002–17. 
Baxter, M., Stockman, A., 1989. Business Cycles and the Exchange-Rate Regime: Some 
International Evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 23 (May), pp. 377–400. 
Berg, A. G., Borensztein, E.R., Pattillo, C.A., 2004. Assessing Early Warning Systems: How 
Have They Worked in Practice? IMF Working Paper No. 04/52 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund).  
Bordo, M. D., 2003. Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Historical Perspective. NBER 
Working Paper 9654 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Bordo, M. D., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D., Soledad-Martinez, M., 2001. Financial 
Crises: Lessons from the Last 120 Years. Economic Policy: A European Forum, No. 
32, pp. 51–82.  
Broda, C., 2001. Coping with Terms-of-Trade Shocks: Pegs versus Floats. American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 91, No. 2 (May), pp. 376–80. 
Bubula, A., Ötker-Robe, I., 2002. The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes since 1990: 
Evidence from De Facto Policies. IMF Working Paper 02/155 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
Bubula, A., Ötker-Robe, I., 2003. Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes 





Calvo, G. A., 1999. Fixed Versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Preliminaries of a Turn-of-
Millennium Rematch. Unpublished manuscript. 
Demirigüç-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E., 1998. The Determinants of Banking Crises in 
Developing and Developed Countries. IMF Staff Papers Vol. 25, No. 1 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
Dooley, M., Folkerts-Landau, D., Garber, P., 2004. The Revived Bretton Woods System: The 
Effects of Periphery Intervention and Reserve Management on Interest Rates and 
Exchange Rates in Center Countries. NBER Working Paper No. 10332 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Dornbusch, R., 2001. Fewer Monies, Better Monies. NBER Working Paper 8324 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Duttagupta, R., Ötker-Robe, I., 2003. Exits from Pegged Regimes: An Empirical Analysis. 
IMF Working Paper 03/147 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Edwards, S., 2001. Exchange Rate Regimes, Capital Flows and Crisis Prevention. NBER 
Working Paper 8529 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Edwards, S., Levy-Yeyati, E., 2003. Flexible Exchange Rates as Shock Absorbers. NBER 
Working Paper No. 9867 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Edwards, S., Magendzo, I., 2003a. A Currency of One’s Own? An Empirical Investigation on 
Dollarization and Independent Currency Unions. NBER Working Paper 9514 





Eichengreen, B., 1994. International Monetary Arrangements for the 21
st Century 
(Washington: Brookings Institution). 
Eichengreen, B., Masson, P., Bredenkamp, H., Johnston, B., Hamann, J., Jadresic, E., Ötker, 
Inci., 1998. Exit Strategies: Policy Options for Countries Seeking Greater Exchange 
Rate Flexibility. IMF Occasional Paper 168 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund). 
Fischer, S., 2001. Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?, Distinguished 
Lecture on Economics in Government. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, 
No. 2 (Spring), pp. 3–24. 
Flood, R. P., Rose, A. K., 1995. Fixing Exchange Rates: A Virtual Quest for Fundamentals, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 36 (August), pp. 3–37. 
Frankel, J. A., Rose, A., 2002. An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade 
and Income. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 2 (May), pp. 437–66. 
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A-M., Ostry, J., Wolf, H., 1997. Does the Nominal Exchange Rate 
Regime Matter? NBER Working Paper 5874 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research).  
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A-M., Wolf, H. C., 2003. Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and 
Consequences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
Giavazzi, F., Giovannini, A., 1989. Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European 
Monetary System (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C., 1999. The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of 




Klein, M. W., Marion, N. P., 1997. Explaining the Duration of Exchange-Rate Pegs. Journal 
of Development Economics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (December), pp. 387–404. 
Larraín, F., and Velasco, A., 2001. Exchange-Rate Policy in Emerging Market Economies: 
The Case for Floating. Essays in International Economics, No. 224 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University). 
Levy-Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., 2002. Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds versus 
Words. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Available via the Internet at: 
www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen. 
Levy-Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., 2003. To Float or to Fix: Evidence on the Impact of 
Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth. American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 
(September), pp. 1173–93. 
Masson, P. R.., 2001. Exchange Rate Regime Transitions. Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April), pp. 571–86. 
Mussa, M., 1986. Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and the Behavior of Real Exchange 
Rates: Evidence and Implications. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, Vol. 25 (Fall), pp.117–214. 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1995. Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 9 (Fall), pp. 73–96. 
Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., Wei, S-J. Kose, M. A., 2003. Effects of Financial Globalization on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, IMF Occasional Paper 220 





Reinhart, C. M. Rogoff, K., 2004. The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A 
Reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics (forthcoming), available via the 
Internet: http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/reinhart/papers.htm. 
Rogoff, K., 1999. Perspectives on Exchange Rate Regimes. International Capital Flows, ed. 
by Martin Feldstein, pp. 441–53 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Rogoff, K., Husain, A. M., Mody, A., Brooks, R. J., Oomes, N., 2003. Evolution and 
Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes. IMF Working Paper No. 03/243 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Rose, A., 2004. A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Common Currencies on International 
Trade. NBER Working Paper No. 10373 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research). 
Summers, L. H., 2000. International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures. 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 90 (May),  
pp. 1–16. 
Thom, R., and Walsh, B., 2002. The Effects of a Currency Union on Trade: Lessons from the 
Irish Experience. European Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 6,  
pp. 1111–23. 
Tornell, A., Velasco, A., 2000. Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides More 
Fiscal Discipline?  
Williamson, J., 2000. Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Markets: Reviving the 





Fig. 1. Natural Classification Regimes by De Jure Category, 1973–99 (In percent of annual observations) 
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* Assumes developing country regime transition rates equal to those for emerging markets. 
 
Note: Future regime distributions calculated on the basis of transition probabilities during 1975-2001, and 
assuming no new transitions to freely falling category. 
 




Table 1. Regime Durability
(Average duration of regime, in years)
All regimes Pegs Intermediate Floats
1940–2001
  All countries 14.3 28.3 16.1 14.4
  Advanced economies 14.3 19.5 18.4 89.0
  Emerging markets 10.3 15.0 15.0 11.0
  Developing countries 16.3 40.9 15.5 5.5
1975–2001
  All countries 11.4 23.2 18.4 14.3
  Advanced economies 19.4 46.0 26.8 88.0
  Emerging markets 8.6 8.4 16.5 11.0
  Developing countries 10.7 27.3 16.2 5.5
Note: Regime durability is measured as the average number of years until a regime transition occurs, based
on Natural classification data. Pegs include both "soft" and "hard" pegs, and transitions from one type of
peg to another are not considered regime changes for these calculations. Similarly, transitions between
different types of intermediate regimes (limited flexibility and managed floats) are not counted as regime
changes. Estimated duration of all regimes includes duration of freely falling episodes.





Table 2. Average Annual Inflation and Real Per Capita GDP Growth:
Comparison of Dual (or Multiple) and Unified Exchange Rate Systems, 1970–99
(In percent)
Regime
Average Annual Inflation 
Rate
Average Per Capita GDP 
Growth
Unified exchange rate 22.0 1.8
(7.7) (2.1)
Dual (or multiple) exchange rates 175.6 0.6
(15.1) (1.4)



















Pegged 17.9 9.6 14.2 24.5 391.7 12.4 33.9
(6.8) (7.9) (10.4) (23.2) (39.9) (6.5) (7.9)
Intermediate 11.2 13.0 16.7 9.2 147.6 25.7 36.0
(3.5) (9.1) (15.1) (3.8) (66.1) (15.9) (10.8)
Floating 20.3 10.1 11.3 8.1 408.9 445.6 138.5
(11.5) (7.5) (8.4) (4.5) (68.6) (22.2) (10.8)
Total 17.1 11.1 14.2 9.9 305.3 55.5 49.7
(6.5) (8.3) (10.8) (4.8) (57.0) (7.6) (8.7)
Note: Figures in parentheses are medians.
Source: Authors' estimates.



















Pegged 2.0 2.6 1.6 -3.2 -1.1 1.0 1.6
(2.0) (2.6) (1.6) (0.5) (-0.7) (0.6) (1.6)
Intermediate 2.8 2.6 1.9 2.7 0.0 2.7 2.1
(2.4) (2.9) (2.1) (2.2) (0.4) (2.7) (2.3)
Floating 3.6 1.7 1.6 2.2 -3.1 -1.6 0.6
(2.9) (1.8) (2.2) (2.3) (-1.2) (-0.3) (1.7)
Total 2.1 2.4 1.7 1.8 -1.3 0.8 1.5
(2.2) (2.6) (2.0) (2.0) (-0.6) (0.6) (1.8)
Note: Figures in parentheses are medians.
Source: Authors' estimates.



















P e g g e d 4 . 03 . 83 . 65 . 74 . 34 . 34 . 0
(2.7) (2.3) (2.6) (3.3) (3.4) (2.9) (2.7)
Intermediate 1.6 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.8 6.1 2.6
(1.2) (1.6) (1.8) (1.7) (3.4) (2.5) (1.8)
Floating 3.1 2.4 4.1 1.9 6.4 4.9 3.8
(1.8) (1.5) (1.9) (1.1) (4.6) (2.9) (1.9)
Total 3.7 2.8 3.5 2.7 4.7 4.5 3.7
(2.4) (1.8) (2.3) (1.3) (3.7) (2.9) (2.4)
Note: Figures in parentheses are medians.
Source: Authors' estimates.


















Pegged 6.3 8.9 25.1 7.0 53.6 6.6 12.7
Intermediate 3.2 4.8 10.5 30.6 42.3 28.4 12.1
Floating 10.5 5.2 11.6 8.4 17.3 14.8 10.4
Total 5.6 6.1 17.9 13.7 37.0 9.2 12.0
Note: Volatility is measured as the three-year centered standard deviation of the annual real effective
exchange rate (IFS, line RECZF). Nicaragua is excluded from this table because its exchange rate
has been extremely volatile, and its inclusion unduly influences the averages.
Source: Authors' estimates.





















All 3.4 4.7 4.5 3.9 3.1 7.1 3.0 3.8
Advanced 0.0 2.7 2.3 4.1 0.0 6.5 0.0 4.2
Emerging 11.4 7.5 7.0 0.0 15.4 8.0 3.8 0.0














All 4.1 4.1 9.2 4.6 4.7 5.2 9.2 4.3
Advanced 3.3 3.9 7.1 4.9 3.6 5.8 8.6 4.9
Emerging 4.6 5.6 10.0 0.0 8.8 6.1 6.9 0.0














All 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.0 3.2 2.6 0.0 0.0
Advanced 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0
Emerging 7.7 3.0 1.8 0.0 15.4 4.0 0.0 0.0
Developing 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Note: Probabilities are calculated by dividing the number of occurrences of a crisis under a particular regime
by the total number of regime years. Each crisis is counted only once and hence, if it persists over multiple years,
the subsequent years are not taken into account for this calculation. Additionally, the years an exchange rate
regime transition takes place (i.e., the year preceding, the year during, and the year following the transition) are
excluded from this computation. A dash (-) indicates that no crisis data were available for developing countries
under freely floating exchange rate regimes.
Source: Authors' estimates.
Twin Crisis (1980–97) Twin Crisis (1990–97)
Bank Crisis (1980–97) Bank Crisis (1990–97)













IMF de jure regime dummies     Pegged (de jure) Pegged regimes
Intermediate (de jure) Intermediate regimes
Floating (de jure) Floating regimes
Natural regime dummies Pegged (natural) Pegged regimes (fine classification 1~4)
Limited flexibility (natural) Limited flexibility regimes (fine classification 5~9)
Managed floating (natural) Managed floating regimes (fine classification 10~12)
Freely floating (natural) Freely floating regimes (fine classification 13)
Freely falling (natural) Freely falling regimes (fine classification 14)
Dependent Variable Control Variables
Inflation (scaled consumer Money growth Broad money growth
price inflation; p/(1+p)) Real GDP growth Real GDP growth
Trade openness Exports plus imports of goods and services (percent of GDP)
Central bank turnover rate Central bank governor turnover rate (per 5 years)
Terms of trade growth Terms of trade growth
Government balance Central government balance (percent of GDP)
Per capita real GDP growth Investment ratio Gross fixed investment (percent of GDP)
Trade openness Exports plus imports of goods and services (percent of GDP)
Terms of trade growth Terms of trade growth, 3 year backward average
Average years of schooling Average number of years of schooling of total population age 25 and older (per 5 years)
Tax ratio General government revenue (percent of GDP), 3 year backward average
Government balance Central government balance (percent of GDP), 3 year backward average
Initial income/U.S. income Ratio of per capita GDP to U.S. per capita GDP in 1970 (international prices)
Population growth Population growth, 3 year backward average
Population size Population (logarithm)
Crisis Variables
Bank crisis From Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997)
Balance of payments crisis From Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo (2004)





































Limited flexibility -0.006 0.007 -0.005 -0.027 -0.029 -0.020 0.025 0.020 0.027
(-1.38) (2.10)** (-1.31) (-1.45) (-1.86)* (-1.28) (1.57) (2.34)** (1.96)**
Managed floating -0.011 0.007 -0.009 -0.027 0.006 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.037
(-1.71)* (1.42) (-1.33) (-1.40) (0.41) (1.64) (1.27) (2.85)*** (2.86)***
Freely floating -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 0.059 0.104 0.091 0.065
(-2.28)** (-4.81)*** (-1.89)* (-0.36) (-0.42) (2.16)** (3.83)*** (3.87)*** (2.65)***
Freely falling 0.225 0.302 0.141 0.234 0.322 0.244 0.232 0.288 0.149
(5.90)*** (7.10)*** (5.60)*** (7.61)*** (13.18)*** (9.04)*** (10.80)*** (16.73)*** (7.50)***
Money growth 0.698 0.285 0.085 -0.032 -0.097 -0.011 0.010 0.015 0.011
(2.44)** (17.12)*** (5.14)*** (-0.31) (-1.02) (-0.10) (1.14) (0.97) (1.14)
Real GDP growth -0.084 -0.114 0.354 -1.498 -2.025 -1.656 -0.442 -0.874 -0.640
(-0.46) (-0.47) (3.15)*** (-2.13)** (-2.90)*** (-2.12)** (-1.58) (-1.82)* (-1.69)*
Trade openness 0.000 -0.006 -0.024 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.032 -0.012 -0.033
(0.01) (-2.04)** (-2.28)** (-1.20) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-2.70)*** (-1.59) (-2.87)***
Central bank turnover rate 0.009 0.020 -0.014 0.094 0.152 0.148 0.044 0.022 0.063
(0.69) (2.10)** (-1.28) (2.60)*** (4.76)*** (4.32)*** (3.44)*** (1.66)* (4.39)***
Terms of trade growth 0.013 0.027 0.003 -0.031 -0.035 -0.037 -0.001 -0.008 -0.009
(1.10) (1.86)* (0.25) (-0.79) (-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.06) (-0.45) (-0.49)
Government balance -0.038 -0.116 -0.033 -0.557 -0.175 -0.677 -0.210 -0.221 -0.324
(-0.51) (-2.02)** (-0.56) (-3.74)*** (-1.64) (-4.75)*** (-2.77)*** (-2.57)** (-3.63)***
Constant -0.018 0.072 -0.446 0.370 0.445 0.249 0.336 0.069 0.341
(-0.31) (6.27)*** (-9.22)*** (1.01) (1.35) (0.62) (3.63)*** (2.49)** (2.30)**
Observations 673 673 673 617 617 617 1401 1401 1401
R-squared 0.82 0.73 0.84 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.44 0.57
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Kuwait has been dropped as discussed in the text.












Table 10. Growth Performance Across Country Groups
Country fixed 
effects




















year lagged regime 
variables
Limited flexibility 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.005 0.014 0.006
(1.04) (1.11) (2.09)** (0.34) (0.57) (-0.56) (-0.71) (3.54)*** (0.79)
Managed floating 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.020 0.010 0.002 -0.008 0.010 -0.005
(1.65)* (1.29) (2.47)** (1.52) (1.12) (0.19) (-1.28) (2.42)** (-0.86)
Freely floating 0.021 0.020 0.018 -0.025 -0.015 -0.020 -0.017 -0.006 0.002
(2.67)*** (2.92)*** (2.13)** (-0.88) (-0.85) (-0.47) (-1.03) (-0.43) (0.15)
Freely falling -0.005 -0.006 0.020 -0.045 -0.035 -0.023 -0.032 -0.019 -0.002
(-0.27) (-0.28) (1.79)* (-3.96)*** (-4.06)*** (-1.24) (-4.29)*** (-3.21)*** (-0.31)
Investment ratio -0.180 -0.092 -0.230 -0.048 0.062 -0.037 -0.033 0.039 -0.025
(-2.74)*** (-1.90)* (-3.78)*** (-0.51) (0.76) (-0.37) (-0.79) (1.41) (-0.58)
Trade openness 0.037 0.015 0.043 -0.006 -0.006 -0.013 0.009 0.016 0.006
(2.51)** (6.15)*** (2.99)*** (-0.19) (-0.32) (-0.35) (0.73) (2.39)** (0.43)
Terms of trade growth 0.056 0.011 0.060 0.011 0.001 0.036 -0.004 0.019 -0.006
(1.64) (0.36) (1.77)* (0.32) (0.03) (0.93) (-0.21) (0.98) (-0.31)
Average years of schooling 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.017 0.005 0.015 -0.010 0.001 -0.014
(-0.02) (-0.88) (0.02) (1.22) (1.33) (1.06) (-2.02)** (0.77) (-2.71)***
Tax ratio 0.029 0.007 -0.010 -0.047 -0.010 -0.029 -0.011 -0.028 -0.013
(0.84) (0.39) (-0.30) (-1.02) (-0.30) (-0.65) (-0.84) (-2.78)*** (-0.94)
Government balance -0.102 -0.065 -0.117 -0.277 -0.086 -0.233 0.070 0.046 0.073
(-2.21)** (-2.08)** (-2.62)*** (-3.37)*** (-1.34) (-2.75)*** (1.77)* (1.62) (1.78)*
Initial income/U.S. income 0.041 -0.021 0.043 -0.285 -0.059 -0.191 -0.022 -0.034 0.015
(1.87)* (-2.50)** (2.00)** (-2.00)** (-2.30)** (-1.67)* (-0.41) (-3.11)*** (0.27)
Population growth 0.123 0.016 0.386 -0.196 0.144 -0.255 -0.679 -0.432 -0.680
(0.23) (0.07) (0.73) (-0.35) (0.41) (-0.44) (-1.95)* (-2.08)** (-1.88)*
Population size -0.133 -0.001 -0.140 0.029 0.003 0.034 -0.020 0.002 -0.003
(-3.08)*** (-0.70) (-3.12)*** (0.94) (0.89) (0.90) (-0.84) (0.83) (-0.11)
Constant -0.176 0.072 -0.173 -0.032 -0.003 -0.074 0.101 0.030 0.070
(-1.98)** (3.18)*** (-1.96)* (-0.27) (-0.12) (-0.55) (1.20) (2.27)** (0.76)
Observations 605 605 596 529 529 520 1228 1228 1209
R-squared 0.38 0.32 0.41 0.30 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.23
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Kuwait has been dropped as discussed in the text.
Advanced Countries Emerging Markets Developing Countries
 
 